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The  literature  on  the  theoretical  and  empirical  aspects  of  the  relationship  between  finance  and 
economic  growth  is  both  substantial  and  extensive.  The  same  cannot  be  said  on  the  relationship 
between financial development and poverty reduction. There has been comparatively little research on 
this equally important aspect. This study aims to fill this gap with this study. We visit the theoretical 
arguments  and  conduct  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  the  capital  account 
dimension of financial liberalization and poverty for developing countries for the period 1985-2005. 
In particular, we test whether capital account liberalization has helped alleviate poverty, and also 
whether the extent to which capital account liberalization affects poverty depends on the quality of 
institutions. We use OLS and IV techniques as well as the system GMM technique. Our findings 
indicate that countries with higher institutional quality have lower poverty rates, but that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between the degree of capital account liberalization during the 
period and the poverty rate.   
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The importance of world poverty alleviation cannot be exaggerated. In 1998 1.2 million 
people in the world lived on or less than $400 per year (Beck et al., 2004). There are also 
dramatic  differences  in  poverty  among  countries,  even  among  developing  countries.   
This paper focuses on the financial aspects of poverty alleviation in developing countries 
and asks whether capital account liberalization can actually lead to lower poverty.  
 
The literature on the theoretical and empirical aspects of the relationship between finance 
and economic activity is both substantial and extensive. The main contributions conclude 
that “with informed policy choices, finance can be a powerful force for growth” (World 
Bank,  2001,  p.1).  Other  requirements  are  also  emphasized.  The  establishment  of 
macroeconomic stability is thought to be a first requirement (Holden and Prokopenko, 
2001), although this factor is not expected to be a sufficient condition. Establishing a 
basis for adequate regulation and supervision of financial institutions is particularly apt in 
developing  and  transition  countries,  because  of  a  greater  need  for  building  public 
confidence in the financial system (Ito, 2006). Holden and Prokopenko (op. cit.) also 
mention the need for financial institutions that are specialized in certain industries or 
certain types of lending, such as factoring and leasing companies or mortgage finance 
companies. These institutions are in a better position than large multi-purpose institutions 
to assess financial and investment plans in their field of expertise. They can help small 
and medium size enterprises with their financing needs in case commercial banks lend 
only to large and well-established firms. Further requirements are also highlighted: the 
importance of strong macroeconomic fundamentals, sound systems of banking regulation 
and supervision, and reasonable economic policies along with sound financial institutions 
being in place, are particularly emphasized (Stiglitz, 2000).  
 
Regrettably and surprisingly, the literature on the relationship between financial development 
and poverty reduction, an aspect of equal importance as that of the nexus between finance and 
growth/development, is disappointingly small. The relevant studies include, Arestis and Caner 
(2005),  Jalilian  and  Kirkpatrick  (2002),  Dollar  and  Kraay  (2002),  Jeanneney  and  Kpodar 
(2008),  Honohan  (2004),  Beck  et  al.  (2004,  2007),  and  Honohan  and  Beck  (2007).  The 
findings of these studies are mixed. Arestis and Caner (2005) report that the growth channel is 
not the only channel through which financial liberalization can affect poverty, but that there 
are two further channels, namely the financial crises channel and the availability of financial 
services  and  credit  channel.  Jalilian  and  Kirkpatrick  (2002)  test  econometrically  the 
relationship between financial development and poverty through the growth channel. Based 
on the estimation of two equations (a growth and a poverty regression), these authors report 
that  the  change  in  growth  of  average  income  with  respect  to  a  unit  change  in  financial 
development is equal to 0.4, and the rate of change in the growth of income of the poor with 
respect to one percent change in the growth of average income of population is approximately 
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equal to 1. They then conclude that one unit change in financial development leads to a 0.4 
percent change in the growth rate of the incomes of the poor, assuming that there are no direct 
effects.   
 
The study by Jeanneney and Kpodar (2008) is concerned with financial liberalization in more 
general  terms.  The  study  argues  that  the  standard  financial  liberalization  effect  of  the 
McKinnon (1973) type is directly effective in reducing poverty, as is the more indirect effect 
via economic growth; the former is found to be empirically stronger than the latter. Dollar and 
Kraay (2002) find that some determinants of growth, such as good rule of law, openness to 
international  trade,  and  developed  financial  markets  have  little  systematic  effect  on  the 
income share of the poor (the bottom quintile). What this means in the authors’ view is that 
such factors ‘benefit the poorest fifth of society as much as everyone else’. Honohan (2004) 
shows that financial depth is associated negatively with poverty. This negative relationship is 
robust even after taking into account the mean income and the share going to the top income 
groups. Honohan and Beck (2007) suggest that ‘effetive finance’ provides a “ladder for the 
poor to climb” (p. 11) and that indeed financial depth is conducive to poverty reduction, so 
that “countries with deep financial system also seem to have a lower incidence of poverty 
than others at the same level of national income” (p. 12). Bank credit to the private sector is 
thought to be the best measure of effective finance since “it captures the degree to which 
banks are channeling society’s savings to productive uses” (p. 21). 
 
There are, though, costs as well (see Honohan, 2004; Beck et al., 2004, 2007; Honohan and 
Beck, 2007). The poor benefit from the banking system’s ability to provide more savings 
opportunities but do not manage to benefit from the greater availability of credit; and to the 
extent  financial  liberalization  affects  growth  positively,  it  also  affects  poverty.  However, 
financial  liberalization  promotes  financial  instability,  which  hurts  the  poor,  who  are 
vulnerable  to  unstable  and  malfunctioning  institutions.  Ultimately,  though,  the  benefits 
outweigh the costs for the poor. 
 
This study contributes to the literature by examining both theoretically and empirically the 
relationship  between  capital  account  liberalization  and  poverty  for  the  first  time.  While 
financial liberalization embodies a number of aspects, namely “… the deregulation of the 
foreign  sector  capital  account,  the  domestic  financial  sector,  and  the  stock  market  sector 
viewed separately from the domestic financial sector” (Arestis and Caner, 2005, p. 92), in this 
study we will deal with only just one aspect, namely the one that focuses on the deregulation 
of  the  foreign  sector  capital  account.  We  are,  thus,  concerned  in  this  study  with  the 
relationship  between  poverty  reduction  and  capital  account  liberalization  directly.  This 
approach  bypasses  the  intermediate  step  of  examining  the  relationship  between  capital 




We focus on developing countries and exclude developed countries from our sample (unlike 
Beck et al., 2004, 2007), because the nature and the extent of poverty in developing countries 
requires more urgent attention, and because we think that the dynamics of poverty reduction 
                                                 
2 A recent study that is concerned with the relationship between foreign capital inflows and economic growth in 
developing and emerging countries is Prasad and Rajan (2008). They find a weak relationship at best. They 
argue, though, that “capital account liberalization may best be seen not just as an independent objective but as 
part of an organizing framework for policy changes in a number of dimensions” (p. 26).    5 
are different in these countries than in developed countries. This is important, especially when 
cross-country heterogeneity is a major concern.  
 
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows: In section 2, we examine the 
theoretical basis of the relationship between capital account liberalization and poverty before 
we  investigate  it  empirically.  In  section  3,  we  describe  how  we  measure  capital  account 
liberalization, poverty and institutional quality.  The empirical strategy that we follow and our 
findings are the focus of section 4; and finally we summarize and conclude in section 5. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
 
Theory provides conflicting predictions concerning the relationship between capital account 
liberalization  and  poverty  alleviation.  On  the  one  hand,  by  ameliorating  information  and 
transaction costs and therefore allowing more entrepreneurs to obtain external finance, capital 
account liberalization improves the allocation of capital, thereby exerting a particularly large 
impact on the poor. To the extent that financial systems function better as a result of capital 
account  liberalization,  financial  services  become  available  to  a  larger  proportion  of  the 
population  and  to  the  poor.  On  the  other  hand,  capital  account  liberalization  and 
improvements in the financial system primarily benefit the rich and those who are politically 
connected. Especially at the early stages of capital account liberalization, financial services, 
and credit in particular, are limited to the wealthy and connected. A greater degree of capital 
account liberalization, then, may only succeed in channeling more capital to the few, but 
certainly not to the poor. A third view poses the question of a non-linear relationship between 
capital account liberalization and income distribution, and more specifically of an inverted U-
shaped curve: at the early stages of capital account liberalization only a few relatively wealthy 
individuals have access to financial  markets. With sustained capital account liberalization 
more people can afford to join the formal financial sector and thus more people can enjoy the 
full benefits. Thus, while the distributional effects of financial deepening are adverse at the 
early stages of capital account liberalization, they certainly become positive after a turning 
point.  
 
The relationship between capital account liberalization and poverty has been examined in the 
literature by focusing on the relationship between capital account liberalization and growth 
with  the  further  assumption  that  higher  growth  alleviates  poverty,  without  paying  direct 
attention to poverty. Liberalization of the capital account is thought to have positive effects on 
economic growth and thereby on poverty. There are a number of channels through which 
capital account liberalization may increase economic growth:  through higher investment, as 
capital flows in to earn higher returns (Prasad et al, 2003; see, also, Henry, 2007; and Henry 
and Sasson, 2008); by lowering the cost of capital via improved risk allocation (Prasad et al, 
2003; Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2000, 2001); through investment in higher risk but 
higher return projects with the help of global diversification of risk (Obstfeld, 1994); through 
increased efficiency and productivity via transfer of technology and managerial know-how 
(Prasad  et  al,  2003;  Agénor,  2002);  through  increasing  incentives,  which  improve  the 
regulatory and supervisory framework of banking; this is helped by letting foreign banks 
introduce a variety of new financial instruments and techniques or by increasing competition, 
which can improve the quality of financial services (Prasad et al, 2003); and through the   6 
‘discipline effect’, whereby governments are forced to pursue better macroeconomic policies 
(Tytell and Wei, 2004; Stiglitz, 2000).
3  
 
It  is  just  as  possible  that  the  capital  account  liberalization  can  slow  down  growth  by 
eliminating  country-specific  income  risk  and  the  impact  of  this  risk  on  saving.  When 
countries share endowment risk via international capital markets, saving and growth rates can 
be lower in financial openness than in autarky (Devereux and Smith, 1994). Rodrik (1998), 
using data on developing as well as developed countries, finds no significant effect of capital 
account liberalization on the percentage change in real income per capita over the period 1975 
to  1989.  Edwards  (2001)  observes  that  the  positive  relationship  between  capital  account 
openness and productivity performance manifests itself only after the country in question has 
reached  a  certain  degree  of  development.  At  very  low  levels  of  domestic  financial 
development a more open capital account may even have a negative effect on performance. 
Edison et al. (2002) find mixed evidence that capital account liberalization promotes long-run 
economic growth and that the positive effects are most pronounced among countries in East 
Asia. A more recent study by Jeanneney and Kpodar (2008), as mentioned before, argues that 
the standard financial liberalization effect of the McKinnon (1973) type is directly effective in 
reducing poverty, as is the more indirect effect via economic growth. But there are costs as 
well. Financial liberalization promotes financial instability; moreover the poor do not benefit 
from the greater availability of credit. Ultimately, though, the authors argue that the benefits 
outweigh the cost for the poor. 
 
It is, thus, not quite clear whether the relationship between capital account liberalization and 
poverty  is negative  as  one  might expect.  The  purpose  of this  paper is  to  investigate  this 
relationship  further  through  an  empirical  investigation  of  the  direct  relationship  between 
capital account liberalization and poverty, thereby bypassing the required further assumption 
that growth and poverty are negatively linked. In this study, we are also interested in the 
relationship  between  institutional  quality  and  poverty.  The  literature  on  institutions  has 
stressed that low-income countries lack a well-developed incentive structure to bring forth 
productive  cooperation  (Olson,  1996).  Such  a  structure  depends  not  only  on  economic 
policies  but  also  on  the  quality  of  the  institutional  arrangements  (see,  also,  World  Bank, 
2001). One such arrangement is a legal system that enforces contracts impartially and makes 
property  rights  secure  over  the  long  run.  Another  is  a  system  of  political  structure, 
constitutional  provisions,  and  good  enforcement  to  monitor  the  extent  of  special-interest 
lobbies and cartels. In countries where institutional mechanism defined in this sense is not 
working properly, one would expect to see a small group of elites to reap the benefits of 
growth and liberalization. 
 
We  can  easily  link  poverty  to  financial  liberalization  and  institutional  quality  and  build 
relevant hypotheses, as this is undertaken below (see section 4). Is it the case that financial 
liberalization has beneficial effects on the poor in countries where the institutional quality is 
high and the poor can share the benefits of liberalization with the rest of the population? 
Another  hypothesis  is  that  increasing  financial  openness  hurts  the  poor;  however,  such 
detrimental side effects can be alleviated, at least to some extent, when good institutions are 
in place.  
 
                                                 
3 A related but different suggestion supports the idea of creating a global pool of reserves out of countries’ 
income with the specific aim to provide more sustained development finance to fight against poverty (Stiglitz, 
2002).   7 
3. Measuring Poverty, Capital Account Liberalization and Institutional Quality 
 
3.1 Measuring Poverty 
 
The data source is the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. The poverty data 
are available from PovcalNet at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp. The 
poverty line used in this paper is twice the extreme poverty line, which is set at $1.08 per day 
($32.74 per month) in 1993 PPP prices. By using this measure, “…we count as poor all those 
who would be judged so by standards more typical of middle-income countries” (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2004).   
 
The  headcount  poverty  index  is  an  important  descriptive  tool.  Although  it  lacks  some 
desirable properties, it is easy to understand and interpret. Mainly due to its simplicity, it has 
become a standard measure in academic and policy work. Therefore we have chosen to use it 
as our poverty indicator. 
 
As  part  of  our  robustness  checks,  we  use  the  income  share  of  the  poorest  20%  of  the 
population as a measure of poverty. Unlike the headcount index, it is a relative measure of 
poverty. This measure has been used in the development literature widely (see for instance 
Beck et al., 2007).  
 
3.2 Measuring Capital Account Liberalization 
 
We adopt the definition in Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003).  The liberalization of the capital 
account is captured by the regulations on offshore borrowing by financial institutions and by 
non-financial  corporations,  on  multiple  exchange  rate  markets  and  on  capital  outflow 
controls. In a fully liberalized capital account regime, banks and corporations are allowed to 
borrow abroad freely. They may need to inform the authorities but permission is granted 
almost automatically. Reserve requirements might be in place but are lower than 10 percent. 
Also, there are no special exchange rates for either the current account or the capital account 
transactions; nor are there any restrictions to capital outflows.  
 
As mentioned by a number of authors (such as Edison et al., 2002), it is not easy to measure 
the extent of openness in capital account transactions. The difficulty lies in capturing the 
complexity of real-world capital controls. First, conventional measures of quantifying capital 
controls sometimes fail to account for the intensity of capital controls. The most prominent 
example of these measures is the binary variable measure based on the IMF’s categorical 
enumeration  reported  in  Annual  Report  on  Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER). The second problem is that the IMF-AREAER based variables are 
not capable of representing the intricacy of actual capital controls. Capital controls can be 
placed on inflows or outflows as well as on the type of the financial transaction. The third 
problem is that it is almost impossible to distinguish between de jure and de facto controls on 
capital transactions. Capital control policies are often implemented without explicit policy 
goals to control the volume and/or the type of capital flows. Furthermore, it is often the case 
that  the  private  sector  circumvents  capital  account  restrictions,  invalidating  the  expected 
effect of regulatory capital controls (see Edwards, 1999). For these reasons, researchers often 
look  at  the  degree  of  financial  integration  among  countries  and  interpret  it  as  de  facto 
restrictions on capital transactions (see Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
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In this study, we use the capital account openness index, KAOPEN developed by Chinn and 
Ito  (2002).  This  index  is  the  first  principle  component  of  four  IMF-AREAER  binary 
variables. These four variables are defined as follows: k1 is the variable that indicates the 
presence of multiple exchange rates; k2 is the variable that indicates restrictions on current 
account  transactions;  k3  is  the  variable  that  indicates  the  restrictions  on  capital  account 
transactions; and k4 is the variable that indicates the requirement of the surrender of export 
proceeds. The sum of these four variables is equal to one when the capital account restrictions 
do not exist, so that the index shows financial openness rather than controls. For controls on 
capital transactions (k3), the index uses the share of a five-year window (encompassing year t 
and the preceding four years) that capital controls were not in effect (SHAREk3) so that: 
 
SHAREk3,t = (k3,t + k3,t-1+ k3,t-2+ k3,t-3+ k3,t-4) / 5 
 
As mentioned in Chinn and Ito (2002), one of the merits of the KAOPEN index is that it 
attempts to measure the intensity of capital controls, insofar as the intensity is correlated with 
the  existence  of  other  restrictions  on  international  transactions.  By  the  nature  of  its 
construction,  one  may  argue  that  the  KAOPEN  index  measures  the  ‘extensity’  of  capital 
controls because it may not directly refer to the stringency of restrictions on cross-border 
transactions, but to the existence of different types of restrictions. However, measuring the 
‘extensity’ of capital controls may be a good proxy to the measure of intensity of capital 
controls. Consider a country with an open capital account. It may still restrict the flow of 
capital by limiting transactions on the current account restrictions or other systems such as 
multiple  exchange  rates  and  requirements  to  surrender  export  proceeds.  Alternatively, 
countries that already have closed capital accounts might try to increase the stringency of 
those controls by imposing other types of restrictions (such as restrictions on current account 
and requirements for surrender of trade proceeds), so that the private sector cannot circumvent 
the capital account restrictions. Another merit of this index is its wide coverage (more than 
100 countries) for a long time period (1970 through 2000).  
 
By the nature of its construction, the KAOPEN index is considered to be a de jure measure of 
financial openness because it attempts to account for regulatory restrictions on capital account 
transactions. Hence, this index is different from price-based measures on financial openness, 
often referred to as de facto measures of financial integration. These two types of financial 
openness  measures  have  their  own  strengths  and  weaknesses.  However,  it  is  almost 
impossible not only to rank the supremacy of these measures, but also to distinguish them. 
One of the drawbacks of the de jure measures on financial openness, as Edwards (1999) 
discusses,  is  that  it  is  often  the  case  that  the  private  sector  circumvents  capital  account 
restrictions; thereby nullifying the expected effect of regulatory capital controls, which can be 
captured by price-based measures. A drawback of the price-based  measures, on the other 
hand, is that the measures, especially those based on the interest rate parity conditions, can 
reflect  changes  in  macroeconomic  conditions  even  if  there  are  no  regulatory  changes  on 
capital account transactions. 
 
Clearly,  the  measurement  of  the  extent  of  capital  account  controls  is  difficult.  Many 
researchers have tried to capture the complexity of real-world capital controls, with varying 
degrees of coverage, and varying degrees of success. For reviews and comparisons of the 
various measures on capital controls utilized by a number of researchers, one might refer to 
Edwards (2001), Edison et al. (2002) and Eichengreen (2002). 
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One might argue that a de jure measure is ineffective in the sense that releasing controls do 
not necessarily lead to more cross-border transactions. The response to such concerns is that 
the factors determining the magnitude of capital flows are many. The investment climate in 
the country, as well as the culture might influence capital inflows.  The policy tool that is 
most  directly  related  to  the  regulation  of  capital  account  transactions  is  capital  account 
liberalization, i.e. eliminating the barriers to allow access. Whether a change in the rules helps 
increase  the  magnitude  of  capital  flows  is  another  question.  Since  this  paper  focuses  on 
regulatory aspects of capital account openness, we think the KAOPEN index is an appropriate 
indicator.  
 
The KAOPEN index was used by Chinn and Ito (2002 and 2006) in their studies of the 
determinants  of  financial  development.  These  researchers  found  that  the  rate  of  financial 
development, as measured by private credit creation and stock market activity, is linked to the 
existence of capital controls, and that a higher level of financial openness contributes to the 
development of equity markets only if a threshold level of institutions is attained, which is 
more prevalent among emerging market countries.  
 
In figures 1 to 6 we have graphed the KAOPEN index and the poverty rate for the six World 
Bank regions merely to get a first impression of their relationship. A quick glance of this 
simplest possible relationship that can be adduced clearly suggests that it does not appear to 
be the case that the relationship adheres to the theory that underpins this relationship. This 
suggests  that  fuller  and  more  systematic  investigation  is  in  order.  This  we  undertake 
immediately below in section 4.     
 
3.3 Measuring institutional quality 
 
The  institutional  quality  data  come  from  the  PRS  Group,  a  private  organization.
4  This 
organization maintains various datasets. One is the IRIS dataset, which includes the following 
variables for the 1982-1997 period: corruption in government, rule of law (law and order 
tradition), bureaucratic quality, ethnic tensions, repudiation of contracts by government, and 
risk of expropriation.
5 In our cross-country regressions, we use the risk of expropriation as our 
institutional quality indicator. It is defined as the risk of ‘outright confiscation and forced 
nationalization’ of property and its values range from 0 to 9. Lower ratings are given to 
countries  where  expropriation  of  private  foreign  investment  is  a  likely  event.  In  such 
countries, specific interest groups may be favoured, leading to a situation in which only these 
favoured groups collect the benefits of economic development. The majority may experience 
stagnant or declining life standards, causing the poverty rate to be high. This line of thinking 
predicts higher institutional quality to be correlated with lower poverty rates. However, the 
case is not trivial. It is possible that an institutional reform may impose high transaction costs 
on the poor and thus increase the poverty rate, as mentioned by Chong and Calderon (2000a). 
After  the  reform,  the  poor  have  to  learn  new  mechanisms  to  survive,  as  the  former 
                                                 
4 Since its founding, PRS has focused on political risk analysis, offering two unique and independent, publicly 
available methodology models, Political Risk Services and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and many 
related products and services. For more information, see http://www.prsgroup.com. 
5 ‘Contract Viability/Expropriation risk’ is a subcomponent of the ‘Investment profile’ variable of the ICRG 
dataset, described below.    10 
mechanisms  are  no  longer  useful.  Such  transaction  costs  may  be  high,  especially  for  the 
poorest and the least educated.  
 
The ‘risk of expropriation’ variable has been used by Acemoglu et al. (2001) in their analysis 
of  the  effects  of  institutions  on  economic  performance.  It  was  also  used  by  Chong  and 
Calderon (2000b), along with the other indicators in the IRIS dataset. In their study, this 
variable is the indicator of institutional quality with the highest explanatory power on the 
poverty rate.  
 
Another dataset, which can be obtained from the PRS Group, is the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), which has 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: political, financial, 
and economic. These data are available for the 1984-2007 period and therefore appropriate for 
the panel data analysis. The political risk data include variables such as investment profile, 
corruption,  law  and  order  and  bureaucracy  quality.  To  be  consistent  with  our  choices  of 
institutional  quality  in  the  cross-sectional  and  panel  analyses,  we  employ  the  investment 
profile variable as an indicator of institutional quality in our panel data analysis. This variable 
ranges from 1 to 12 where higher values indicate lower risk. 
 
 
4. Empirical Strategy and Evidence 
 
4.1 Empirical Strategy 
 
A glance at the data presented in Table 1 shows that countries have very different experiences 
regarding capital account liberalization, growth, institutional quality and poverty. Countries 
such as Thailand and China experienced large reductions in poverty and high growth rates 
with relatively closed capital accounts. Panama had an open capital account, moderate growth 
rate and a moderate reduction in poverty rate. Chile is a country with good institutions that 
achieved substantial reduction in poverty with substantial liberalization and high growth rate. 
Uganda  liberalized  its  capital  account  with  not  much  change  in  poverty  rates.  In  short, 
liberalizing the capital account does not appear to be a necessary condition for growth and 
poverty reduction. 
 
We attempt to answer two main questions in this study. The first is whether the countries with 
higher levels of capital account openness have lower poverty rates. The second question is 
whether the effect of capital account openness on poverty depends on the level of institutional 
quality in the country. The period of investigation for the purposes of this study is 1985-2005. 
This is entirely determined by the availability of data. It is actually the longest time span for 
which data exist for most of the variables that are included in our estimable relationships.  
 
We  follow  two  empirical  strategies;  cross-country  analysis  and  panel  data  analysis.  As 
described in more detail below, in the cross-country analysis we take period averages of all 
variables,  thereby  reducing  the  dataset  to  include  only  one  observation  per  country.  In 
contrast, the panel data analysis involves building several non-overlapping sub-periods. As 
mentioned in the literature (for example, by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2008, among others), 
when compared to the cross-country approach, the panel data approach has some important 
advantages and one disadvantage. As a first advantage, with panel data we can make use of 
both the time-series and the cross sectional variation in the data. A second advantage is that in 
the cross-country regression, the unobserved country-specific effect is part of the error term   11 
so that correlation between the error term  and  the explanatory variables results in biased 
coefficient estimates. Furthermore, if the lagged dependent variable is included among the 
regressors, which is usually the case in cross-country regressions, then the country-specific 
effect is certainly correlated with the regressors. To control for the presence of unobserved 
country-specific effects, the traditional method is to first-difference the regression equation to 
eliminate  the  country-specific  effect  and  then  use  instrumental  variables  to  control  for 
endogeneity.  This  approach  is  known  to  eliminate  biases  due  to  country-specific  omitted 
variables.  
 
Another advantage of panel data analysis, and a disadvantage of cross-country analysis, is that 
the latter model with instrumental variables does not control for the potential endogeneity of 
all  the  regressors.  Uncontrolled  endogeneity  can  lead  to  inappropriate  inferences  on  the 
coefficient of main interest. The panel data approach takes care of the endogeneity problem 
by using lagged values of the regressors as instruments. The main problem associated with 
panel  data  analysis  is  using  data  averaged  over  shorter  time  periods.  This  means  that 
estimation results show us shorter-term effects and probably not long-term effects, which 
should be kept in mind when comparing the cross-country estimates with the panel estimates.  
 
 
4.2 Empirical Results  
 
4.2.1 Cross-country regressions 
 
To conduct a cross-country analysis, and thereby explain the change in poverty, we specify 
our model as follows:    
 
(1)     
 
or, equivalently,  
 
(1’)      
 
where P is the poverty rate, KAOPEN is the capital account openness index, and I is the 
institutional quality indicator. In the regression equation,   and   are the initial and end-of-
period poverty measures, respectively. We include the initial poverty measure as a regressor 
for two reasons. First, poverty rates usually change very slowly; and secondly, having such a 
regressor helps control for the country-specific factors that explain poverty in the particular 
country.  
 
The matrix   includes various control variables such as the natural logarithm of initial per 
capita income [ln(Y)] and region dummies. All other variables in this matrix are expressed as 
their period averages. These variables are: (1) ‘Growth’, the growth rate, included since we 
are interested in estimating the direct effect of capital account liberalization after controlling 
for the growth effect. This is expected to have a negative sign; (2) ‘Fertility’, the fertility rate, 
which is expected to have a positive sign since larger households are expected to be poorer; 
(3) ‘Schenrol’, secondary school enrolment rate (% of gross), and (4) ‘Primary’, the primary 
rate of schooling, which are included to control for the human capital stock and are expected 
to  have  negative  signs;  (5)  ‘Inflation’,  inflation  rate;  included  to  control  for  the 
macroeconomic environment and is expected to have a positive sign; (6) the ‘Gini’ measure   12 
of  inequality.  This  variable  is  included  since  the  alleviating  effects  of  growth  and 
liberalization on poverty are thought to depend on the level of inequality. With a higher level 
of  inequality,  there  are  a  higher  number  of  households  that  can  be  relieved  of  poverty, 
therefore  the ‘Gini’  variable  is  expected to  have  a negative  sign;  (7)  ‘GovCons’,  general 
government final consumption expenditure, taken as a percentage of GDP, and it is expected 
to have an ambiguous sign, since a higher share of government expenditure may or may not 
reduce poverty, depending on how the  expenditure is allocated  to different groups in the 
country;  and  (8)  ‘ln(Y)’,  the  logarithm  of  per  capita  GDP,  which  is  expected  to  have  a 
negative sign since higher mean income is associated with lower poverty.  
 
We also include the interaction term between the KAOPEN index and institutional quality to 
test for threshold effects. It is possible that the beneficial effects of capital account openness 
display  themselves  only  after  the  country  reaches  a  certain  level  of  institutional  quality.  
Another way to say this is that only countries with a certain level of institutional quality 
benefit from capital account openness. The interaction term helps us test for the existence of 
such an effect. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the cross-country regressions are presented 
in Tables 2 and 3. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that there is quite a degree of 
variation  in  the  data  utilized  so  that  one  should  be  confident  that  reasonable  estimated 
relationships should emerge. Both the standard deviations and the minimum/maximum values 
tend to validate this statement. Turning to Table 3, the correlation coefficients do not appear 
to indicate any serious problems in terms of the relationships to be estimated. We then turn 
our attention to the estimated relationships.  
 
4.2.2 OLS and IV Estimation 
 
Equation  (1)  is  estimated  first  by  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS).  We  report  the  results  of 
equation (1) by including in addition to the main variables a number of control variables as 
indicated above. The estimates and the p-values of these estimates (in brackets) are reported 
in Table 4. Evidently, and as expected, initial poverty rate is positively related to the end-of-
period poverty rate. It is also statistically highly significant in the regression. Moreover, a 
higher level of institutional quality is associated with a lower level of poverty. A one-point 
increase in the institutional quality indicator reduces poverty rate by slightly less than one 
percentage point. The effect is significant at 4-6% level in some regressions, but not in others. 
Although  the  coefficient  estimate  of  the  KAOPEN  index  takes  a  negative  value  in  most 
regressions, meaning that higher openness is associated with lower poverty, its effect has very 
low levels of statistical significance in the regressions. It is true that none of the coefficients is 
remotely  significant.  The  average  growth  rate,  fertility  rate  and  the  Gini  index  are  all 
statistically significant with expected signs. Higher values of average growth rate and Gini 
index are associated with lower end-of-period poverty rates, while a higher fertility rate is 
associated  with  higher  poverty  rates.  The  interaction  effect  (KAOPEN*I)  is  statistically 
insignificant. So are the education-related controls.  
 
In  column  (7)  of  Table  4  we  report  the  estimates  of  the  regression  that  includes  region 
dummies. There are six regions, as specified by the World Bank, namely East Asia, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, 
South  Asia,  and  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  The  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  dummy  is  the 
excluded one in the regression. The coefficient estimates for these dummy variables reflect   13 
regional differences that remain in poverty rates even after controlling for many country-
specific characteristics. All of these dummy variables enter the regression with a positive 
sign.  The  Eastern  Europe,  South  Asia  and  Sub-Saharan  Africa  dummies  are  statistically 
significant at 2%, with the rest being statistically insignificant. 
 
In Table 4, we report, along with the number of observations, the R-squared statistic, and the 
p-value of Ramsey’s RESET test for possible specification error. The null hypothesis for this 
test is that the powers of the fitted values of the dependent variable have no significance in the 
regression, which is rejected only for the specification in column (2).  It then follows that the 
estimated relationships are not  misspecified, and we should, thus, have confidence in the 
linear specification, with the mentioned exception.   
 
Although  we  have  specified  the  regression  equations  in  such  a  way  as  to  minimize 
endogeneity, it is still possible that capital account openness is endogenous to poverty. One 
could  construct  the  argument  that  countries  that  have  high  poverty  rates  would  be  more 
willing to experiment with financial market liberalization than countries that are doing well in 
this respect. This would lead to an endogeneity bias in our estimates. In order to control for 
possible endogeneity of the KAOPEN variable and the interaction term  , we 
use instrumental variables (IV) estimation. Various instruments, such as the legal origin of the 
country (Beck et al., 2000), government budget surplus, lagged per capita GDP and regional 
dummies (Chong and Calderon, 2000) have been used for financial development. We know of 
no instruments for financial, and in particular, capital account liberalization. It is not clear to 
us  whether  the  instruments  mentioned  above  are  uncorrelated  with  the  error  term  in  our 
regressions, therefore we choose to use a different instrument set. The instruments that we use 
are the deviations of KAOPEN and the interaction term between KAOPEN and I from their 
region-specific means.
6 Our instruments have high correlation with the endogenous variables 
by construction and low correlation with the error term, under the condition that the degree of 
correlation of shocks to poverty in a country with KAOPEN index in that country is similar to 
their correlation with KAOPEN index in other countries within the region. The estimation 
results are presented in Table 5.  Evidently, the IV estimates are not drastically different from 
the OLS estimates.  
 
In Table 5, along with the coefficient estimates and their p-values, we report the p-values of 
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity. The null hypothesis of this test suggests that 
OLS estimation of the equation would yield consistent estimates; that is, any endogeneity 
associated  with  the  regressors  would  not  have  deleterious  effects  on  OLS  estimates.  A 
rejection of the null indicates that the effect of the endogenous regressors on the estimated 
relationship is meaningful, and instrumental variables techniques are required. As can be seen 
in Table 5, the p-values of this test range from 0.08% to 13.9%. It thus follows that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected in most, but not all, cases. Although this means that the IV method 
should be used, OLS and IV estimates are very similar in magnitude. Therefore, for practical 
purposes, we may conclude that either set of equations can be used. 
 
                                                 
6  The  instrument  is  defined  as  the  deviation  of  variable  X  from  its  region-specific  mean,  expressed  as 
, where   is the instrument and there are R countries in the region that country i 
belongs to. These instruments have high correlation with the endogeneous variables and low correlations with 
the error terms by construction.   14 
We also report in Table 5 under the ‘first-stage results’ heading the partial R-squared statistic 
from the regression of the endogeneous variables on all exogeneous variables. The R-squared 
values are high, which indicates that our instruments are appropriate in the sense that they are 
very highly correlated with the endogeneous variables.    
 
 
4.2.3 Panel data estimation 
 
The  previous  analysis  helps  us  determine  the  extent  to  which  cross-country  variation  in 
poverty can be explained by the variation in the (exogenous part of the) KAOPEN index. 
However, the analysis assumes that, keeping all observable factors the same, countries have 
similar poverty levels, since they have similar unobserved characteristics. Even though we 
include the beginning-of-period level of poverty as a regressor, this may not be enough to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity. We would also like to know if changes over time in 
capital account openness of a country have any effect on poverty. Such concerns can be 
addressed by panel data analysis. With panel data analysis, we also increase the degrees of 
freedom by including the variability in time dimension.     
 
The  model  in  equation  (1)  assumes  that  the  error  term  is  identically  distributed  across 
countries. This may be invalid if there are strong country-specific effects that determine the 
level of poverty in a country. Furthermore, time effects are ignored in equation (1).  
 
To  conduct  panel  data  analysis,  we  rewrite  (1)  as  a  dynamic  panel  regression  model  as 
follows: 
 
(2)      
 
where t stands for the period and i represents country as before. In this setting, the error term 
is  composed  of a  country-specific  fixed  effect,  a  time-specific  effect,  ,  and a  time-
varying random error term, the last term in equation (2). 
 
We divide the 1985-2005 period into five non-overlapping subperiods. The five subperiods 
include years 1985-88, 1989-92, 1993-96, 1997-2000 and 2001-2005. All variables in the 
regression equation are defined as subperiod averages. Our panel has a short time dimension, 
but  the  number  of  cross-sectional  units  is  large.  We  should  mention  that  the  estimation 
technique that we use is designed for data with these characteristics. The technique is called 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, as explained below.  
 
In our cross-country regression model, the country-specific effect   is part of the error term. 
If   is correlated with the explanatory variables, then the coefficient estimates are biased. 
Notice that lagged poverty rate is a regressor and it is correlated with   . To solve the bias 
problem  the  country-specific  effect  can  be  eliminated  by  taking  the  first-difference  of 
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However, taking first differences creates another problem. In the first-differenced equation, 
the error term is correlated with the   term. The standard treatment of this 
problem is to use the lagged values of the explanatory variables in levels as instruments in the 
difference equation. This is the way we have adopted in this study. 
 
There are two further problems regarding the estimation of equation (2) by differencing. First, 
the cross-country dimension of the data is lost. Second, if the regressors in equation (2) are 
persistent  over  time,  then  their  lagged  values  are  weak  instruments  for  the  regression  in 
differences.  This can lead to a large bias in estimates. To address these problems, we estimate 
the  regression  in  differences  jointly  with  the  regression  in  levels  using  the  Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. The procedure uses lagged levels of the regressors as 
instruments in the difference equation, and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments 
in the levels equation. This method, called the ‘system GMM’ has been proposed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and has been used in many studies (see, for example, Beck et al., 2000 and 
Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2008).  
 
Another advantage of this  method  is that we can  control for potential endogeneity of all 
regressors, unlike the cross-country IV regression which controls for the endogeneity of only 
the  capital  account  openness  variable.  Controlling  for  the  endogenity  of  all  regressors  is 
achieved by using the lags of all explanatory variables as instruments, called the internal 
instruments. The variables that are believed to be exogenous can be specified as additional 
instruments,  which  are  called  the  external  instruments.  In  our  case,  these  are  the  time 
dummies. To sum up, the main arguments for using the system GMM estimation are that it 
does  not  eliminate  cross-country  variation,  it  reduces  potential  biases  of  the  difference 
estimator in small samples, and it can control for the potential endogeneity of all regressors.          
 
To obtain system GMM estimates, we use the ‘xtabond2’ command in Stata version 9.2. One 
useful  feature  of  this  command  is  that  it  implements  the  ‘forward  orthogonal  deviations’ 
transformation, which works as follows: instead of subtracting the previous observation from 
the current one, it subtracts the average of all future available observations of a variable. 
Regardless  of  the  number  of  gaps  in  the  data,  this  transformation  is  computable  for  all 
observations except the last for each country, so it minimizes data loss. And since lagged 
observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as instruments. This method is very 
helpful in making full use of the data in our case, since poverty data are notoriously sparse 
and taking differences would leave us with a very small sample size to work with (Roodman, 
2006).  
 
Our system GMM estimates are presented in Table 6. As before, the initial level of poverty 
has a positive sign and is statistically highly significant. A higher level of institutional quality 
is associated with lower poverty rates, as before, and the effect is statistically significant in 
most regressions. The effects of the control variables are mostly the same as before. The main 
differences are in the KAOPEN and Growth variables, as explained below. 
 
In  the  GMM  estimation,  unlike  the  previous  findings,  we  find  that  countries  with  more 
liberalized  capital  account  regimes  have  higher  poverty  rates.  This  is  a  striking  result. 
Although the effect is not statistically significant in all specifications, it is in some. Another 
major difference of these estimates from the previous ones is that the statistical significance of 
the  growth  variable  has  been  reduced  substantially.  In  the  cross-country  regressions,  the 
estimates  showed  that  countries  with  higher  average  growth  rates  during  the  1985-2005   16 
period had lower poverty rates at the end of the period, ceteris paribus. That is to say, the 
long-run effect of growth on poverty is clearly beneficial. Our GMM estimates are based on 
four-year subperiods, which are probably too short to represent the long-run. In the short run, 
the poverty reducing effect of growth may not be as clear.  
 
In Table 6, we report the p-values of the Arellano-Bond second-order autocorrelation test 
applied to the residuals in differences (see Roodman, 2006, for more information). This test 
checks for the existence of first-order autocorrelation in  . If the  terms in equation (2) 
are serially correlated of order 1 then, for instance,    is endogenous to the   in the 
error term in differences, making    an invalid instrument. In such a case, one needs to 
use deeper lags as instruments. The p-values of the Arellano-Bond test are quite high, which 
means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation. Therefore, 
there is no need to restrict the instruments to deeper lags. In the same table, we also report the 
p-values of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions.  With high p-values, the test fails 
to  reject  the  null  hypothesis,  which  clearly  suggests  that  the  instruments  are  valid.  The 
existence  of  too  many instruments  has  been  shown  to  cause  problems  (Roodman,  2006). 
Although there is no clear guidance on how many is too many, Roodman (2006) recommends 
a rule of thumb, which says to keep the instrument count below the number of countries. To 
establish that, we restricted the lags used in the instruments in our regressions as necessary.   
 
 
4.3 Further Robustness Checks 
 
To make sure that our findings are not specific to the poverty measure that we adopt, we try 
an alternative measure, namely the income share of the poorest 20% of the population. We 
repeat the cross-sectional OLS and panel data system GMM estimations for this alternative 
measure. Our new results, which are reported in Tables 7 and 8, only make our previous 
results stronger. Based on the signs of the coefficient estimates of the KAOPEN variable 
obtained by OLS and GMM, we can say that a higher degree of capital account liberalization 
is associated with lower income share of the poorest 20% of the population, although the 
effect is not statistically significant in all regressions. Consistent with our previous findings, 
higher institutional quality is associated with higher income share of the poor, and growth 
increases the income share of the poor, although these effects are not statistically significant 
in all regressions.  We therefore conclude that our findings are robust to a change in the 
poverty measure used in the analyses.  
 
As  another  robustness  analysis,  we question  whether a  specific  region  is  determining the 
results. To answer this question, we exclude the regions from the regressions one by one. 
Tables  9  and  10  present  our  findings.  We  pick  the  specifications  that  include  the  most 
regressors. In Tables 9 and 10, column (1) shows us the OLS estimates when East Asian 
countries are excluded from the regression. In the other columns, other regions are excluded. 
Evidently, our results are qualitatively the same. The most noteworthy changes occur when 
we drop Eastern European and Latin American countries from the sample, columns (2) and 
(3) respectively. This is to some extent due to a sizable reduction in the sample size. Estimates 
for the growth effect seem to be the most influenced by sample restriction. 
 
 
4.4 Discussion of the Results 
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In  general  terms  theory  provides  conflicting  predictions  concerning  the  relationship 
between  capital  account  liberalization  and  poverty  alleviation.  On  the  one  hand,  by 
ameliorating information and transaction costs and therefore allowing more entrepreneurs 
to  obtain  external  finance,  capital  account  liberalization  improves  the  allocation  of 
capital, thereby exerting a particularly large positive impact on the poor. To the extent 
that financial systems function better as a result of capital account liberalization, financial 
services become available to a larger proportion of the population and to the poor. On the 
other  hand,  it  is  likely  that  capital  account  liberalization  and  improvements  in  the 
financial  system  primarily  benefit  the  rich  and  those  who  are  politically  connected. 
Especially at the  early stages of capital  account liberalization, financial services, and 
credit in particular, are limited to the wealthy and well connected. A greater degree of 
financial globalization, then, may only succeed in channeling more capital to the few, but 
certainly not to the poor. A third view poses the question of a non-linear relationship 
between capital account liberalization and income distribution, and more specifically of 
an inverted U-shaped curve: at the early stages of capital account liberalization only a 
few  relatively  wealthy  individuals  have  access  to  financial  markets.  With  sustained 
capital account liberalization more people can afford to join the formal financial sector 
and thus more people can enjoy the full benefits. Thus, while the distributional effects of 
financial  deepening  are  adverse  at  the  early  stages  of  financial  globalization,  they 
certainly  become  positive  after  a  turning  point.  So  that  even  if  capital  account 
liberalization  leads  to  higher  growth,  it  is  an  open  question  whether  capital  account 
liberalization that ensues will narrow or widen income distribution.  
 
We have tested these propositions in the case of capital account liberalization. Theoretical 
propositions have been tested against data for a number of developing countries in a cross-
country data set up. Relevant econometric techniques have been employed to bear on the 
question of whether and how capital account liberalization influences poverty. We thereby 
hope to have thrown a great deal of light on the conflicting theoretical issues identified above 
through new empirical evidence. Interestingly enough the existing empirical evidence, such as 
it exists, is as conflicting, if not more so than the theory, and extremely sparse at the moment. 
We have demonstrated that capital account liberalization does little to alleviate poverty. By 
contrast, it is the design of high quality institutions, and to a much lesser extent economic 
growth, that affect poverty alleviation. In summary, this paper proposes a way to directly test 
a question that has considerable policy importance. All regression results reported in Tables 4 
to 8, suggest that capital account liberalization is not associated with a significant decrease in 
the poverty rate or an increase in the income share of the poor. In fact, liberalization of the 
capital  account  increases  poverty  according  to  the  system  GMM  estimates.  Our  findings 
indicate also that good institutions, proxied as explained above, are associated with a decline 
in poverty. Furthermore, in our estimated relationships we tried to control for the possibility 
of endogeneity of the capital account liberalization variable. Endogeneity does not present any 
problems in our final results.  
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions  
 
We have suggested in this contribution that surprisingly little work has been undertaken on 
the relationship between capital account liberalization and poverty. A great deal of work has 
been initiated and done on the relationship between financial liberalization and growth; but 
rather very little on one form of financial liberalization, of the capital account variety, and   18 
poverty. We have attempted to throw some light on the latter relationship by concentrating on 
developing countries for which data are available. 
 
Three important results have emerged from this attempt. We find very little evidence, if any at 
all,  on  the  hypothesis  that  capital  account  liberalization  alleviates  poverty.  The  second 
important result is that a significant variable that would potentially have some impact on 
poverty is better quality of institutions. The third important result is that the initial level of 
economic activity as proxied by GDP is an additional significant variable. An interesting 
implication of our findings is that policies that can engineer better quality of the institutional 
set up and can also affect the level of economic activity and its distribution are by far better 
ways of influencing poverty in the right way. Capital account liberalization does not appear to 
promote  reduction  in  poverty.  These  basic  results  must  be  very  disappointing  to  the 
proponents of capital account liberalization. 
 
These findings are in fact not surprising when we think about the living conditions of the poor 
in developing countries. These people are mostly unskilled self-employed people, working on 
their  extremely  small-sized  farms,  or  as  artisans  or  small-scale  entrepreneurs  in  shops  or 
homes. The main constraints they face are marketing, credit, insurance and infrastructure. 
Such needs often require competent domestic policy-making and cannot be expected to be 
fulfilled by foreign investors. Moreover, if the needs of these people are not met, capital 
account  liberalization  may  increase  their  vulnerability  by  leaving  them  open  to  intense 
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Figure 1: Graphs showing the plots of the KAOPEN index versus the headcount poverty 
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Figure 2: Graphs showing the plots of the KAOPEN index versus the headcount poverty 
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Figure 3: Graphs showing the plots of the KAOPEN index versus the headcount poverty 
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Figure 4: Graphs showing the plots of the KAOPEN index versus the headcount poverty 
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Note: The only poverty data for the 2000s are Jordan (2002) and Tunisia (2000). 
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Figure 5: Graphs showing the plots of the KAOPEN index versus the headcount poverty 
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Figure 6: Graphs showing the plots of the KAOPEN index versus the headcount poverty 
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Table 1: Data on poverty, capital account openness, institutional quality and growth for 






0 KAOPEN D D D DKAOPEN I Growth
Argentina 0.01 0.18 0.16 0.17 3.44 5.9 1.28
Bangladesh 0.83 0.84 0.01 -1.22 1.70 5.4 2.32
Bolivia 0.47 0.43 -0.04 0.82 3.34 6.4 0.77
Brazil 0.30 0.21 -0.09 -1.37 1.70 6.2 0.81
Bulgaria 0.00 0.10 0.10 -1.00 0.55 7.9 1.51
Chile 0.25 0.06 -0.19 -0.96 3.27 8.2 4.19
China 0.86 0.65 -0.21 -1.29 0.66 6.8 8.36
Colombia 0.13 0.20 0.07 -1.36 0.66 6.6 1.45
Costa Rica 0.18 0.09 -0.09 -0.15 3.08 7.3 2.00
Cote d'Ivoire 0.29 0.48 0.20 -0.83 1.04 6 -1.63
Dominican Republic 0.23 0.12 -0.11 -1.27 1.96 6.8 2.60
El Salvador 0.43 0.40 -0.03 0.37 4.38 6 1.50
Guatemala 0.66 0.31 -0.35 0.73 4.38 7 1.02
Honduras 0.60 0.36 -0.24 -0.53 2.53 6.5 0.12
India 0.92 0.88 -0.04 -1.04 1.04 6.7 4.14
Indonesia 0.76 0.54 -0.22 2.11 1.49 6.4 3.38
Jamaica 0.23 0.16 -0.07 0.70 3.72 7.3 1.13
Lithuania 0.01 0.08 0.08 2.50 0.28 9.9 0.78
Mali 0.55 0.73 0.17 -0.52 1.04 5.9 1.81
Mexico 0.25 0.19 -0.06 0.33 3.00 8 0.75
Nigeria 0.91 0.92 0.01 -1.15 1.38 5.4 1.87
Pakistan 0.89 0.66 -0.22 -1.13 0.66 5.2 2.57
Panama 0.24 0.18 -0.06 2.62 0.00 6.9 1.55
Peru 0.10 0.34 0.24 0.95 4.38 6.3 0.67
Philippines 0.60 0.44 -0.15 -0.15 2.34 6.6 1.05
Poland 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.66 1.30 7.7 3.35
Sri Lanka 0.51 0.41 -0.10 -0.04 2.34 6.6 3.35
Thailand 0.54 0.29 -0.25 -0.05 0.00 7.1 4.75
Tunisia 0.16 0.07 -0.09 -0.89 1.04 7.1 2.59
Turkey 0.16 0.16 0.00 -0.73 1.04 6.6 2.40
Uganda 0.97 0.96 -0.01 0.28 4.38 6.7 2.54
Uruguay 0.03 0.06 0.03 1.70 2.13 7.9 1.78
Venezuela, RB 0.20 0.34 0.14 0.16 4.10 5 0.02
 
Note: The reported values are the initial headcount poverty rate, the end-of-period poverty rate, the 
change in the poverty rate, average CA openness (KAOPEN index) during the period, the change in 
CA openness during the period, the average institutional quality (investment profile in the ICRG data) 
and the average growth rate, respectively.   26 
 




Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
P
T 0.2799 0.2450 0.0049 0.9228
P
0 0.2614 0.2918 0.0000 0.9091
KAOPEN -0.0861 1.2029 -1.4604 2.6233
I 5.2550 1.4420 2.0000 9.0000
ln(Y) 8.2551 0.7782 6.4772 9.3458
Growth 1.7468 2.1715 -4.9257 8.3551
Fertility 3.0369 1.5362 1.4795 7.2155
Schenrol 71.8104 23.9062 14.8719 98.7621
Inflation 81.7280 147.1903 0.9050 594.5378
Gini 40.5105 9.5963 25.7714 59.6100
GovCons 13.9245 4.4298 4.6470 24.4352
Primary 86.2002 17.4258 22.4224 102.2952  27 









KAOPEN -0.1934 -0.1649 1
I 0.0231 0.1336 -0.0907 1
ln(Y) -0.8206 -0.7952 0.2539 -0.0346 1
Fertility 0.6871 0.6304 -0.1035 0.1573 -0.7009 1
Schenrol -0.7333 -0.7618 0.2068 -0.147 0.7889 -0.8634 1
Inflation -0.2059 -0.3084 -0.1555 -0.1309 0.3413 -0.2073 0.3736 1
Gini 0.132 0.2564 0.024 0.3185 -0.0363 0.3992 -0.3076 0.0278 1
GovCons -0.3656 -0.4625 0.0873 -0.4536 0.3391 -0.2452 0.3579 0.1772 -0.3043 1
Primary -0.5414 -0.491 0.1557 -0.0936 0.5585 -0.8011 0.8557 0.3134 -0.2187 0.1596 1
Growth 0.1263 0.3822 -0.1399 -0.0017 -0.3414 -0.1072 -0.1413 -0.243 -0.1825 -0.3085 0.1196 1
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Table 4: OLS Regression coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses)  
 
Dependent variable: Headcount index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
P
0 0.718 0.503 0.795 0.722 0.673 0.654 0.606 0.798 0.683
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
KAOPEN -0.009 0.003 -0.013 -0.010 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.009 0.004
(0.4735) (0.7947) (0.2252) (0.3563) (0.6455) (0.5069) (0.8710) (0.5240) (0.7784)
I -0.008 -0.004 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008





Growth -0.031 -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 -0.026 -0.031 -0.028





Fertility 0.047 0.040 0.048
(0.0434) (0.0081) (0.035)
GovCons -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(0.1864) (0.2157) (0.1553)




East Asia dummy 0.105
(0.1136)








R-squared 0.7852 0.8253 0.8395 0.8431 0.8855 0.8809 0.8897 0.8398 0.8872
Number of obs. 49 49 49 49 48 49 49 49 48
Ramsey's Reset 0.1168 0.0073 0.1341 0.338 0.3835 0.3791 0.8154 0.1431 0.4845
 Notes: All regressions include a constant. 
- In all regressions, standard errors are robust to the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity. 
- The countries included in the cross-country regressions are Argentina, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, 
Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Estonia, Guatemala, Honduras, Croatia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Sri Lanka, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Mexico, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, El Salvador, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.    29 
Table 5:  Instrumental variables (IV) regression coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses)  Dependent variable: Headcount Index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
P
0 0.728 0.496 0.802 0.720 0.678 0.656 0.802 0.690
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
KAOPEN 0.006 0.016 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.010
(0.653) (0.209) (0.921) (0.964) (0.965) (0.806) (0.859) (0.556)
I -0.008 -0.004 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008





Growth -0.030 -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 -0.030 -0.028





Fertility 0.046 0.041 0.047
(0.021) ** (0.002) *** (0.012) **
GovCons -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(0.133) (0.170) (0.085) *
Gini -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
(0.001) *** (0.001) *** (0.001) ***
Primary 0.001 0.001
(0.640) (0.524)
Number of obs 49 49 49 49 48 49 49 48
R-squared 0.7807 0.8224 0.8369 0.8409 0.885 0.8806 0.836 0.8867
Durbin-Wu-Hausman p-value 0.0008 0.0024 0.0024 0.0037 0.0405 0.0885 0.1391 0.0803
1st-stage results:
Instrument 1 (Partial R
2) 0.9169 0.9188 0.92 0.9242 0.948 0.9511 0.9427 0.9416
Instrument 2 (Partial R
2) 0.8947 0.909
   30 
Notes: All regressions include a constant. 
- Instruments: Deviations of KAOPEN and (KAOPEN*I) from their region-specific means as explained in the text. 
- The countries included in this Table are the same as reported in ‘Notes’ to Table 4. 
- In all regressions, standard errors are robust to the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity. 
- The first-stage results include Shea's ‘partial R-squared’ measure of instrument relevance that takes intercorrelations among instruments into account. 
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Table 6:  System GMM coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses)   Dependent variable: Headcount index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
P
0 0.887 0.903 0.689 0.796 0.771 0.691 0.769
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
KAOPEN 0.012 0.011 0.003 0.010 0.018 0.015 0.013
(0.090) * (0.060) * (0.700) (0.374) (0.044) ** (0.110) (0.098) *
I -0.011 -0.006 -0.009 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011
(0.048) ** (0.273) (0.103) (0.042) ** (0.003) *** (0.021) ** (0.028) **
Growth -0.742 0.073 0.458 -0.472 -0.287 -0.783
(0.044) ** (0.895) (0.415) (0.339) (0.598) (0.133)
Fertility 0.042 0.023 0.026 0.035 0.015
(0.061) * (0.274) (0.138) (0.159) (0.502)
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.846) (0.762) (0.362) (0.985)






Number of obs 173 172 170 170 170 170 145
No.countries 67 67 67 67 67 67 65
No.instruments 35 44 57 42 59 56 61
Arellano-Bond 0.329 0.354 0.373 0.251 0.342 0.377 0.615
Hansen test 0.325 0.478 0.557 0.534 0.526 0.472 0.668
 
 
Notes:   All regressions include a constant. 
- The countries whose data are included in these regressions are Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Chile,  China,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Cote  d’Ivoire,  Croatia,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  El  Salvador,  Estonia,  Ghana,  Guatemala, 
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova,   32 
Mongolia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
- The estimates are obtained by using the one-step system GMM estimation technique implemented by the ‘xtabond2’ command in Stata, version 9.2. 
The ‘xtabond2’ command allows the researcher to choose various options. We chose the orthogonal deviations option to maximize the sample size. 
Therefore, the estimated system of equations is composed of the levels equations, and the level equations transformed by orthogonal deviations. Since 
the estimation procedure assumes that errors are correlated only within countries and not across them, and since contemporaneous correlation is 
probably the most likely form of cross-country correlation, we included time dummies to remove time-related shocks from the error term. The use of 
time dummies is highly recommended (see Roodman, 2006), as it makes this assumption more plausible.  
 
- We used two sets of instruments. The first set includes traditional IV-style instruments, which are the time dummies. The second set includes the 
GMM-style instruments, in which each lag of the instrumented variable acts as an instrument.     33 
Table 7: Robustness check: 
OLS Regression coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses)  
Dependent variable: Income share of the poor 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IncShare
0 0.7055 0.7276 0.7053 0.7783 0.3709 0.3155 0.6113 0.7176 0.5490
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0290) (0.0692) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0222)
KAOPEN -0.1637 -0.1131 -0.1691 -0.1093 -0.1826 -0.1315 -0.1178 -0.4098 -0.4300
(0.2026) (0.3318) (0.1997) (0.3305) (0.1353) (0.2604) (0.3080) (0.0199) (0.0096)
I 0.1041 0.1081 0.0970 0.0970 0.0373 0.0593 0.0769 0.1129 0.0813





Growth 0.0297 0.0428 0.0149 0.0099 -0.0163 0.0370 0.0593





Fertility 0.1030 0.1004 0.0684
(0.5081) (0.4426) (0.6647)
GovCons 0.0096 0.0086 0.0284
(0.7244) (0.7433) (0.2867)




East Asia dummy 0.1285
(0.8174)








R-squared 0.8513 0.8671 0.8517 0.8765 0.9027 0.8936 0.8885 0.8709 0.9184
Number of obs. 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 41 40
Ramsey's Reset 0.5864 0.8404 0.5649 0.8264 0.691 0.2931 0.4282 0.5987 0.5556
 Notes: All regressions include a constant. 
- In all regressions, standard errors are robust to the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity.   34 
Table 8:  Robustness check:  
System GMM coefficient estimates and p-values in italics 
Dependent variable: Income share of the poor 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IncShare
0 0.8581 0.7685 0.7702 0.8618 0.0666 0.0719 0.1596
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4320) (0.3880) (0.0290)
KAOPEN -0.2147 -0.2968 -0.3118 -0.2206 -0.1236 -0.1348 -0.0735
(0.1490) (0.0150) (0.0010) (0.1450) (0.0900) (0.0330) (0.2230)
I 0.0845 0.0328 0.0376 -0.0743 -0.0454 -0.0577 -0.0608
(0.3270) (0.7080) (0.6400) (0.4430) (0.4360) (0.2270) (0.2010)
Growth 12.4023 13.4416 11.5619 2.9797 4.8687 2.8117
(0.0620) (0.0250) (0.0440) (0.4070) (0.1030) (0.3700)
Fertility 0.0845 0.0859 0.0047 0.0402 -0.0176
(0.4950) (0.6850) (0.9690) (0.6920) (0.9060)
Inflation 0.0006 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005
(0.4430) (0.6540) (0.9750) (0.2770)






Number of obs 141 140 139 139 139 139 121
No.countries 61 61 61 61 61 61 60
No.instruments 35 44 57 42 59 56 61
Arellano-Bond 0.914 0.756 0.758 0.723 0.183 0.127 0.106
Hansen test 0.872 0.596 0.503 0.697 0.399 0.418 0.630
 
Notes:   All regressions include a constant. 
-  The  estimates  are  obtained  by  using  the  one-step  system  GMM  estimation  technique 
implemented by the ‘xtabond2’ command in Stata, version 9.2. The ‘xtabond2’ command allows 
the researcher to choose various options. We chose the orthogonal deviations option to maximize 
the sample size. Therefore, the estimated system of equations is composed of the levels equations, 
and the level equations transformed by orthogonal deviations. Since the estimation procedure 
assumes  that  errors  are  correlated  only  within  countries  and  not  across  them,  and  since 
contemporaneous correlation is probably the most likely form of cross-country correlation, we 
included  time  dummies  to  remove  time-related  shocks  from  the  error  term.  The  use  of  time 
dummies  is  highly  recommended  (see  Roodman,  2006),  as  it  makes  this  assumption  more 
plausible.  
 
- We used two sets of instruments. The first set includes traditional IV-style instruments, which 
are the time dummies. The second set includes the GMM-style instruments, in which each lag of 
the instrumented variable acts as an instrument.   
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Table 9: Robustness check: Regional influences 
OLS Regression coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses)  
Dependent variable: Headcount index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P
0 0.654 0.667 0.719 0.638 0.651 0.774
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
KAOPEN 0.003 -0.072 0.003 -0.002 0.006 0.004
(0.841) (0.527) (0.850) (0.917) (0.696) (0.753)
I -0.008 0.008 -0.016 -0.006 -0.005 -0.012
(0.207) (0.637) (0.010) (0.290) (0.468) (0.021)
KAOPEN*I -0.003 0.013 -0.007 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005
(0.440) (0.551) (0.193) (0.481) (0.341) (0.254)
Growth -0.029 -0.021 -0.034 -0.027 -0.026 -0.038
(0.015) (0.233) (0.000) (0.011) (0.023) (0.000)
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.806) (0.030) (0.328) (0.980) (0.592) (0.911)
Fertility 0.058 0.039 0.038 0.068 0.054 0.005
(0.043) (0.220) (0.071) (0.005) (0.040) (0.788)
GovCons -0.008 -0.005 -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010
(0.091) (0.447) (0.047) (0.314) (0.368) (0.022)
Gini -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004
(0.007) (0.063) (0.292) (0.004) (0.006) (0.028)
Primary 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.416) (0.746) (0.729) (0.236) (0.576) (0.136)
R-squared 0.8905 0.8904 0.9465 0.8907 0.8617 0.8742
Number of obs. 43 33 32 46 43 43
Ramsey's Reset 0.4814 0.436 0.4315 0.7149 0.3982 0.0859
 
Notes: Notes to Table 4 apply. 
The OLS estimates in columns (1)-(6) were obtained by excluding one region from the 
regression at a time. In column (1) East Asian countries were excluded; in (2) Eastern 
European; in (3) Latin American; in (4) Middle Eastern; in (5) South Asian; in (6) Sub-
Saharan Africa countries were excluded from the regression.    36 
Table 10: Robustness check: Regional influences 
System GMM coefficient estimates and p-values (in parentheses)  
Dependent variable: Headcount Index  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P
0 0.831 0.811 0.719 0.706 0.672 0.770
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
KAOPEN 0.012 -0.008 0.014 0.020 0.020 0.011
(0.248) (0.590) (0.412) (0.207) (0.138) (0.360)
I -0.017 -0.012 0.004 -0.014 -0.018 -0.015
(0.085) (0.286) (0.775) (0.260) (0.099) (0.261)
Growth -0.300 -1.270 -0.803 -0.487 -0.219 -0.324
(0.717) (0.152) (0.411) (0.578) (0.757) (0.625)
Fertility 0.027 0.057 0.047 0.096 0.033 0.050
(0.315) (0.312) (0.170) (0.116) (0.416) (0.277)
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.652) (0.833) (0.097) (0.852) (0.942) (0.898)
Gini -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 -0.002 -0.004
(0.356) (0.631) (0.528) (0.053) (0.500) (0.158)
GovCons -0.004 -0.017 -0.014 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003
(0.373) (0.111) (0.080) (0.491) (0.444) (0.650)
Primary 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.000
(0.338) (0.430) (0.848) (0.168) (0.779) (0.992)
Number of obs 119 114 89 132 127 124
No.countries 57 50 45 61 60 52
No.instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31
Arellano-Bond 0.794 0.946 0.38 0.71 0.45 0.769
Hansen test 0.67 0.796 0.603 0.908 0.462 0.627
 
Notes: Notes to Table 6 apply. 
The system GMM estimates in columns (1)-(6) were obtained by excluding one region from 
the regression at a time. In column (1) East Asian countries were excluded; in (2) Eastern 
European; in (3) Latin American; in (4) Middle Eastern; in (5) South Asian; in (6) Sub-
Saharan Africa countries were excluded from the regression.  
To keep instrument count below the number of countries, we used three period or deeper lags 
of the regressors as instruments.  